Model Minority and Honorary White? Structural and Individual Accounts on Being Asian in Sweden

Abstract

This chapter gives an overview of the socioeconomic situation of Asian immigrants, and their decedents, in Sweden. With the steady growth in the number of immigrants from Asian countries to Sweden since the 1970s, Asians are becoming increasingly visible among the Swedish population. However, they are rarely represented in the public, political, and academic discussions. As a first step to tackle the “narrative scarcity” (Lee and Ramakrishnan, RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 7 (2):, 1–20, 2021), we use register data to describe the educational position and employment situation of the 10 largest East, South and Southeast Asian groups in Sweden, in comparison to non-Asian immigrant groups. We found differences based on the regions of origin: East Asian groups are highly educated but have lower employment rates. Once employed, they work in highly skilled occupations. Southeast Asians have lower education and, therefore, are underrepresented in highly skilled jobs but have high employment rates. South Asians stand between these two groups.

When I hear the phrase “Asians are next in line to be white,” I replace the word “white” with “disappear.” Asians are next in line to disappear. We are reputed to be so accomplished, and so law-abiding, we will disappear into this country’s amnesiac fog. We will not be the power but become absorbed by power, not share the power of whites but be stooges to a white ideology that exploited our ancestors. This country insists that our racial identity is beside the point, that it has nothing to do with being bullied, or passed over for promotion, or cut off every time we talk. Our race has nothing to do with this country, even, which is why we’re often listed as “Other” in polls and why we’re hard to find in racial breakdowns on reported rape or workplace discrimination or domestic abuse. Minor Feelings (Hong, 2020)

Introduction

With the Covid-19 pandemic, persons racialized as Asians, especially East Asians, experienced increased racial harassment and tensions (Chen & Wu, 2021; Bilgili et al., 2023, this volume). For example, in the United States, it was reported that in the first quarter of 2021, hate crimes against Asians increased by more than 300% compared to the first quarter of 2020 (CSUSB, 2021). At the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, the “I am not a virus” campaign emerged in France (Pailliez & Cotton, 2020). The hashtag #StopAsianHate gained traction on the social media platform Twitter. Even in Sweden, during Covid-19, implicitly racially charged expressions increased. Although Swedish statistics on hate crimes do not differentiate Asians in Sweden as a targeted population, the report of hate crimes in 2020 mentions Asians and their exposure to hate crimes in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic (Stendahl, 2021); the first time this population is specifically called out as a target of racially charged incidents in this report.

In contemporary Sweden, characterized by racial and ethnic diversity, discussions about the success and failures of migration and integration are the subject of regular political and social debates. Researchers are paying specific attention to racial discrimination and inequity in Sweden, especially on anti-Black racism (Wolgast et al., 2018; Wolgast & Wolgast, 2021). In addition to the Black Lives Matter movement in Sweden, there is a heightened racial awareness in Sweden. For example, Landsrådet för Sveriges ungdomsorganisationer (LSU—the National Council for Swedish Youth Organisations) launched an anti-racism video series called “Non-White-White Talk Show,” which consists of five episodes focusing on anti-Black, anti-Sami, anti-Semitism, anti-Romani, and anti-Muslim (LSU, 2022). The Swedish government has decided on five action programs against various forms of racism for the period 2022–2024 for the above-mentioned groups as well. These programs are important toward a more equitable society (Regeringen, 2022). However, there is one group that is consistently invisible from this anti-racist political, social, and research arena: Asians.

The number of immigrants from Asian countries has increased significantly since the 1970s. Immigration from Asian countries escalated following the 2008 labor migration law reform, which gave individual employers autonomy to recruit and employ people from outside EU countries. The number of persons with Asian citizenships residing in Sweden increased from around 4500 in 1974 to 106,000 in 2022. China, India, and Pakistan are among the top ten countries of origin for individuals immigrating to Sweden. Despite their increasing physical presence, only a few studies specifically address the experiences of Asians in Sweden (e.g., Osanami Törngren, 2020; Hübinette, 2021). Further, a systematic analysis on the socioeconomic status and outcomes of Asians in Sweden is absent.

This chapter tackles the “narrative scarcity” (Lee & Ramakrishnan, 2021) of Asians in Sweden. The fact that 70% of Asians in Sweden today are in fact first-generation immigrants underscores the urgency of this contribution. We define Asians in Sweden as people of South, East, and Southeast Asian origins in Sweden, which includes persons who are foreign-born immigrants, the native-born children of these individuals, and further generations.¹ In order to explore the role of early acculturation and network building, we split the foreign-born into two groups: those who migrated at or before the age of 13 and those who migrated thereafter. We conduct statistical analysis of register data from 2012 to describe the educational attainment and employment situation of Asians in Sweden. This chapter is a first step in mapping out and understanding the ethnic and racial positions of Asians in Sweden, an attempt to ensure that Asians in Sweden do not “disappear” in the otherwise monolithic understandings of immigrants and natives.

‘Asians’ in Sweden

Although Sweden lacks statistics on self-identified ethnicity and racial identity, a unique set of statistics covering the total population of Sweden, includes information on the country of birth, citizenship, and migration status, is however, available. In the United States though, analysis based on racial identification on census can give detailed accounts on experiences of those who identify as Asian as a whole, while the heterogeneity of the group based on different national and ethnic origin is harder to capture (Lee & Ramakrishnan, 2021). The Swedish statistics, on the other hand, can give a detailed account on the heterogeneity of individuals who may be racialized as Asians based on national origins. However, since we assign Asian racial and ethnic identification based on the countries of birth (of the individuals and their parents), there is a risk that this information might not correspond to their true ethnic and racial self-identification.

In this chapter, we define Asians in Sweden as people with origins in South, East, and Southeast Asia.² This includes all individuals who were born in the Asian regions and those individuals who are born in Sweden with one or two parents born in South, East, or Southeast Asia.

Asians are one of the fastest growing immigrant groups in Sweden, accelerated by the 2008 Labor Migration Law Reform (Riksdagen, 2008). Prior to 2008, immigration from non-EU countries was predominantly limited to refugee migration and family reunification. According to 2020 statistics, there are a total of 332,210 Asians in Sweden, comprising about 3.4% of the total Swedish population.³ Among Asians, 70% are first generation, 10% are second generation, and 20% are mixed. When we look at the gender ratio for the first generation, we see that Southeast Asians are predominantly female (Table 12.1).

Table 12.1 Share of women and men among Asians in Sweden by region of origin, 2020 (%)

Among Asians, those with origins in Thailand are the largest single group (19%), followed by India (17%), China (14%), Vietnam (9%), Pakistan (9%), Philippines (8%), South Korea (6%), Bangladesh (5%), and Sri Lanka (4%). As of 2020, these nine countries account for 90% of the Asian population in Sweden (SCB Statistic Database, 2020) (Fig. 12.1).

Fig. 12.1

Asian nationalities in Sweden, by country of birth, 2020. Source: SCB Statistic Database (2020), compiled by authors

The Asian diaspora is quite diverse—Asians are a mix of people, including persons with backgrounds from countries with differing economic status. Asians represents people with all possible immigration backgrounds, from refugees, labor migrants, marriage migrants, to transnational adoptees—each trait may significantly affect not just their socioeconomic positions but also the path to integration in Swedish society. This is not unique to Sweden, rather it reflects the experience of Asian diaspora across the West. It is why stereotypes and perceptions of Asians may positively and negatively affect individual lives. As mentioned earlier, 70% of the Asian population in Sweden are first-generation immigrants. Among these first-generation Asians, 45% of those who were born in Vietnam, 68% in South Korea, and 63% in Sri Lanka, have been residing in Sweden for over 20 years, while other groups are predominantly newly arrived within the last 5 years (SCB Statistic Database, 2020).

In this chapter, we specifically focus on the top 10 countries of origin, which comprise 90% of the Asian population. These are people with origins in Thailand, India, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Japan.⁴ Between 2010 and 2012, a large majority of the Asians newly arriving in Sweden from these countries were in three categories: family migrants, labor migrants, or students.⁵ Compared to immigrants arriving from the Middle East or Africa, only a very small portion of Asians sought international protection in Sweden.⁶ Between 2010 and 2012, more than half of all South Koreans and about one-third of Chinese, Japanese, Bangladeshi, and Pakistanis moving to Sweden arrived as students. More than half of the people from India and Thailand, as well as one-third of those coming from Japan, Bangladesh, and China, entered Sweden as labor migrants. Finally, about two-thirds of the people coming from the Philippines, more than half of those from Vietnam and Sri Lanka, and one-third of the Thai migrated under a family unification/reunification program. Most of the “other” categories are those who received a visitor’s permit.⁷ These differences are important for understanding the socioeconomic position of Asians in Sweden (Fig. 12.2).

Fig. 12.2

Total number of residency permit issued in the period 2010–2012 (%). Source: Migrationsverket (2022), compiled by authors

Why Is it Interesting to Focus on Asians in Sweden?

Asians are increasingly visible both in numbers and across media in Swedish society. The Covid-19 pandemic indeed brought the problem of anti-Asian racism to the Swedish public sphere, albeit temporary. Swedish media, including radio, television, and newspapers, reported on Asians in Sweden being targets of anti-Asian racism (e.g., SVT, 2020). The heightened awareness also led to a wider discussion on anti-Asian racism in Sweden, including, among others, public broadcasting service producing special episodes on racism against Asians (UR, 2021).

However, there are very few studies in Sweden focusing on Asians and we do not know much about their positions in Swedish society. Existing studies include historical accounts of Asian immigration to Sweden (Yamasaki, 1996; Kjellgren, 2001), Asian representation (Hübinette & Tigervall, 2012), Vietnamese and Karen refugees (Rönnqvist, 2009; Suter & Magnusson, 2015; Suter, 2021) the experiences of East Asian adoptees in Sweden (Hübinette & Tigervall, 2008; Lindblad & Signell, 2008; Hübinette & Tigervall, 2009), and Asian marriage migrants (Hedman, 2009; Hedman et al., 2009; Averås, 2013; Kieu, 2020).

Historically and contemporary, Asians encompass both the colonizer and the colonized. In the past decades, its countries not only are exploited but also contribute and engage in new forms of colonization through economic strength. This unique position is also reflected in the contradictory, yet coexisting, images of Asians held by the West. Especially East Asians, who simultaneously represent “yellow peril” and the “model minority.” Yellow peril, an irrational fear of Oriental conquest, originates from the European imagination as early as the fifth century and implies a notion of threat. In contrast, the idea of model minority is a more contemporary idea that affirms the status quo and assimilation of Asians in a host society. The model minority myth suggests compatibility between key elements of Asian and European cultures, such as being hardworking (Okihiro, 1994; Tuan, 1998; Wu, 2002). The images of the model minority and the compatibility of Asians are present in Sweden as well. The crime rate is reported to be lower compared to other immigrant groups, at the same level as individuals with two Swedish-born parents (Martens, 2005). Additionally, supposedly “positive” images of Asians as “good immigrants,” filled with images such as “hard-working” and “good at school” flourish (Lindh, 2020). A survey conducted by EXPO⁸ shows that respondents are more positive toward Asians than Middle Easterners or Africans (Aarnivaara, 2022).

However, Asians also experience not just racism and discrimination but also gendered stereotypes. Typically, Asian women are sexualized and men are asexualized (Lindh, 2020). These experiences are reflected in our previous research (Osanami Törngren, 2011, 2020; Emilsson et al., 2014), where accounts of experiences with microaggressions, discrimination, and sexualization are documented. High-skilled Asian migrants and mixed Asians experience daily racialization and microaggressions, which are often dismissed as “positive” stereotypes (Emilsson et al., 2014; Osanami Törngren, 2020; Osanami Törngren 2022). This research indicates the majority society’s perception that East Asians are not well integrated into Swedish society, but that they find the lack of integration acceptable because Asians are self-sustainable, not making trouble, and considered hard-working. While Swedes report positive images of Asians and sympathize with why Asians want to self-segregate, Asians are also not as preferred as marriage partners (Osanami Törngren, 2011).

The idea of yellow peril emerged and spread at the end of the nineteenth century in Sweden. Viktor Rydberg, a well-known writer, member of the Swedish Academy, and professor of culture and art history, was among the proponents of the idea of an economic war of life and death between the White race and the “yellow” one (Jacobsson & Bruchfeld, 1999; Lundberg, 2004). The resulting images have persisted throughout the pandemic, remaining in focus with the ongoing political turmoil between China and the West. While Asian immigrants and their descendants are seen as model minorities, Asia itself is seen as a threat, economically and politically, especially in times of Covid-19 and the political situation with China, which creates tensions. Even in Sweden “Eating bats” and “Do you dare to take the Chinese vaccine?” (Utrikesbyrån, 2020a, 2020b), and “Chinese threats” are recurring headings in Swedish news. The globally circulated images of China are converging, confounded with populations that might be racially and ethnically Asian but not necessarily Chinese. Consequently, Asians are increasingly vulnerable to expressions of racial hate in many different countries.

Kim (1999, p. 106), specifically looking at Asian American experiences, stresses the importance of addressing racialization process as mutually constitutive of one another:

Asian Americans have not been racialized in a vacuum, isolated from other groups; to the contrary, Asian Americans have been racialized relative to and through interaction with Whites and Blacks.

Asians occupy the “racial middle” position (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). Kim suggests an understanding of race relations based on the idea of racial triangulation and racial positions through two distinct processes, “relative valorization” and “civic ostracism.” Relative valorization refers to the process where the dominant group (native-born White Americans) valorizes one subordinate group (Asians) relative to other minority groups, typically Black Americans, in order to maintain the racial hierarchy. Civic ostracism refers to the process where the dominant group (native-born White American) constructs a minority group (Asians) as distinctively different from the dominant group. In this mechanism of racial triangulation, model minority images and myth are effectively used not only to stereotype Asians but also to keep other minorities down; simultaneously, the image of yellow peril also puts Asians as not quite “White” and “majority.”

Tawa et al. (2013) further specifies this triangulation of how Black and Asians in the United States are positioned in relation to each other through myths of “meritocracy” and “nativity.” In relation to other minorities, Asians are constructed as a group with “merit-based power,” having achieved economic and educational levels close to Whites, however, Asians are only “similar” to Whites. Research shows that there are large socioeconomic disparities between different ethnic groups within Asian Americans. Further, Asian Americans also face significant racism and discrimination in the labor market (e.g., Chin, 2020). While Asians may be racially positioned higher relative to the Black American population due to the idea of meritocracy, research shows that Black Americans are perceived as being more “American” and native, thus having “native-based power.” How individuals are positioned in this mechanism of triangulation and how society maintains hierarchy shapes not only the perceptions and structures that the majority population uphold but also minority populations and perceptions of self, which may lead to internalized racisms and oppressions, which can be understood as

the individual inculcation of the racist stereotypes, values, images, and ideologies perpetuated by the White dominant society about one’s own racial group, leading to feelings of self-doubt, disgust, and disrespect for one’s race and/or oneself. (Pyke, 2010, p. 553)

In this chapter, we take the starting point of the above understanding of racial triangulation as a theoretical perspective in exploring where Asians stand in Swedish society. In the Swedish context, we should understand the racial triangulation of Asians in relation to native-born Swedes, as the dominant group, and other racial minorities, including Middle Eastern Swedes and Afro-Swedes. In a society as diverse as Sweden, when immigrant integration is seen as “a two-way process involving immigrants’ receptiveness to the structures, systems, and norms of a host society and the host society’s own engagement toward the immigrants” (Lerpold et al., 2023, p. 8), it becomes crucial to understand the complexity of racial positions between minority groups. For example, it has been clear during the pandemic that the perpetuators of anti-Asian hate crimes and incidents can be by both minority and majority backgrounds.

While Asians in Sweden are invisible from public and political debates on integration, the demand for assimilation and integration is often forced on other immigrant groups in Sweden that are considered a problem and a threat, especially Middle Easterners and immigrants of Islamic background. This can be empirically examined through the perspective of racial triangulation. In this chapter, we do not examine the personal experiences that inform discrimination, racism, and internalized racial positions, but we do try to unpack the myth of the model minority and understand the mechanism of racial triangulation, nativity-based power, and meritocracy-based power that forms the positions of Asians by systematically analyzing the socioeconomic positions. As populations of Asians in Sweden grow, whether the group constitutes a meaningful social and political category becomes increasingly important. This chapter is a first step in identifying the socioeconomic experiences of the heterogeneous Asian population in Sweden, which may form or divide the Asian experiences and identity.

Socioeconomic Position of Asians in Sweden

As introduced earlier, there are a handful of qualitative studies examining experiences of specific Asian immigrant groups, however, there is a scarcity of statistical overviews and analysis comparing different Asian groups in Sweden, including in relation to other immigrants. In order to contribute to the development of this literature, in this section, we use STATIV register data from 2012 to present a descriptive overview of the socioeconomic status of Asians in Sweden before the Covid-19 pandemic. These data should be understood as a snapshot of Sweden in 2012, trends in the migration and integration of Asians as defined in this chapter, and as a first step in systematically understanding the socioeconomic position of Asians in Sweden. Due to the changing migration regulations and the steadily increasing stock of Asian population in Sweden, there is a need to follow-up the analysis regularly, exploiting longitudinally updated data as well as consider the impact of the pandemic.

Data and Variables

STATIV is a longitudinal database for integration studies that contains information on all individuals residing in Sweden. This information includes socioeconomic and demographic variables, including those indicating every individual’s country of origin. Everyone has a unique anonymous identifier that can be linked to that of their spouse and their parents. In the absence of self-reported data on race or ethnicity in official statistical sources in Sweden, we use these variables as proxies for ethnicity.

Socioeconomic status is measured by looking at the levels of education, employment rates, occupational level, and education to job match. Two of these variables require further explanation. The original variable describing occupational level (SSYK3) includes nine occupational levels from managers to elementary occupations. This variable is then recoded into “Job qualification” by classifying the nine occupational levels into four groups according to the average required qualifications for each occupation. This classification is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the STATIV documentation provided by Statistics Sweden. Finally, a third variable is computed based on “Job qualification” to include only occupations that require the highest level of qualifications, namely, managers and professionals (“High-skilled jobs”).

The quality of employment can also be described by looking at how a person’s education matches the skill requirements of his or her job (see Dahlstedt, 2011; Irastorza & Bevelander, 2017; Kazlou & Wennberg, 2023, this volume). To compute the variable education to job match, we first recoded the original variables on describing highest achieved level of education by using the same grouping of four levels of qualifications/education as we did for “Job qualification.” We then matched these two variables to obtain a three-category variable: overqualified for the occupational level, underqualified for the occupational level, or right match between occupational level and education.

In the analysis, we look at the top 10 Asian groups⁹ and compare them with the two major immigrant groups in 2012 of European (Finland and Poland), Middle Eastern (Iraq and Iran), African (Somalia and Eritrea), and North America/Oceania (United States, Canada, and Australia) origins in order to understand whether there are common experiences among Asians as a whole and how they relate to the outcomes of other groups. We look at socioeconomic outcomes across the so-called generations by dividing the foreign-born population into those who migrated to Sweden before versus after the age of 13,¹⁰ and Asians who are born in Sweden with two parents originating from selected Asian countries.¹¹ Analysis on these three distinct groups will infer how time spent in Sweden may change socioeconomic positions.

University Education

The three panels in Fig. 12.3 depict the share of university graduates among Asians and seven other nationalities in Sweden across the generations selected for this analysis. The figure shows, across generations analyzed and represented in consecutive panels within Fig. 12.3, that East Asians (Japan, China, South Korea) and South Asians (India plus men from Pakistan and Bangladesh) have the highest share of people with university education. This might not be surprising as many East Asians and South Asians enter Sweden with student permits or for labor market reasons. Among non-Asian nationalities, people from the United States, Canada, and Australia (USCAU) have the highest share of university graduates.

Fig. 12.3

Share of people with tertiary education aged 25–60 in Sweden by major nationalities, 2012. Note: data are missing for Iranian women who migrated before the age of 13

Among the foreign-born Asian groups who migrated to Sweden after the age of 13, Southeast Asians (people with origins in Vietnam/Cambodia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka) are among those with the lowest share of university graduates. These are groups that predominantly migrate to Sweden for family reasons. While people with origins in Vietnam/Cambodia, Thailand, and Philippines also show lower share of higher educated people in further generations, the proportion Sri Lankan women with higher education is increasing among the children of immigrants. Other nationalities with a low share of university graduates across the three generations include the two selected African countries and Finnish men.

The share of women from East Asia and from Southeast Asia with university education is higher than that of men across the three generations considered. This is also the case among South Asians plus people from Thailand who migrated at an earlier age or were born in Sweden but not among those who moved to Sweden after the age of 13.

Employment Rates

The three panels in Fig. 12.4 depict the incidence of employment across generations. It is interesting to observe that the employment rates of the foreign-born who migrated after the age of 13 show almost completely opposite patterns to that of education. That is, East Asians, who have the highest share of university graduates, are now among those with the lowest employment rates; whereas Southeast Asians, who have a low share of university graduates, plus the Bangladeshi, have the highest employment rates.

Fig. 12.4

Employment rates of people aged 25–60 in Sweden by major nationalities, 2012

The low employment rates among Asian groups with a high share of university graduates could be explained by the potentially higher occupational aspirations among this group. The higher entry barriers to professional occupations, where the level of regulation is higher, often require access to local networks. Existing studies conducted in Sweden show that, for certain immigrant groups, secondary education is as important—if not more—for finding employment as tertiary education (Dahlstedt & Bevelander, 2010). Highly educated refugees have occupational aspirations and often decide to invest in further education before entering the labor market (van Heelsum, 2017; Bygnes, 2021; Mozetič, 2021). There might be discrimination at play that our descriptive analysis of register data could not capture (cf. Ahmed et al., 2023, this volume).

While the share of people with tertiary education among different nationalities was similar across the three generations analyzed, it is interesting to see that the employment situation differs across the generations. In contrast to those who migrate after the age of 13, among the countries of origins that we compare, we observe higher employment rates across all foreign-born Asians who moved to Sweden early in life, together with those who came before the age of 13 with origins in Finland and Eritrea. Chinese, Pakistanis, and Vietnamese/Cambodians are among those who show lower employment rates together with Iraqis and Somalians. However, we should note that the differences in the proportions between the groups are very small when it comes to this group compared to Asians migrating after the age of 13.

Among the children of immigrants, we see patterns that are somehow similar to those who migrated after the age of 13. Chinese and Japanese are among those with the lowest employment rates, whereas South Korean men have the highest employment. Non-Asian groups with high employment rates are, once again, Eritreans. Like in the case of foreign-born people who moved to Sweden after the age of 13, other groups with low employment rates are Somalians and Iraqis.

Pakistani and Bangladeshi have the largest gender gap in employment, favoring men, among Asians who migrated after 13, together with people from Afghanistan and Somalia. Among foreign-born who moved to Sweden after turning 13, the differences are almost evened out and, for most groups, women have marginally higher employment rates. This is also the case for the children of immigrants, with the exception of South Koreans, Afghanis, and Pakistanis, among whom slightly more men than women are employed.

Employment in High-Skilled Occupation

While the employment rates of Asians do not resemble their level of education, the share of them working in highly skilled occupation does. This is especially true for East Asian nationalities (Japan, South Korea, and China) across the generations analyzed. Moreover, foreign-born South Asians, like India and Pakistan, also show the highest share of people working in managerial and other highly skilled positions among the countries we compare. Men from USCAU and women from USCAU, Finland, Poland, and Iran also have a high representation of people working in these occupations.

People from Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as South Asian countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka, or with ancestors from these countries, on the other hand, are among those with the lowest share of people employed in highly skilled jobs. Other groups on this side of the spectrum include Eritrea, Somalia, and Iraq.

The gender gap is quite significant among the foreign-born who migrated after turning 13. Among Asians, the share of men working in highly skilled positions is considerably higher than the share of women among the Japanese, Indian, Chinese, South Koreans, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi. This pattern is not in line with the numbers presented for university education in Fig. 12.3, which shows a higher representation of women for most of these nationalities. However, like in the case of employment rates, the gap becomes marginal for those who migrated before the age of 13 and those who are children of immigrants, among which, in many cases, women are in a better position than men (Fig. 12.5).

Fig. 12.5

Share of employed people working in highly skilled occupations aged 25–60 in Sweden by major nationalities, 2012

Overqualification

We complete the analysis of the socioeconomic position of Asians in Sweden by showing some figures on their education to job mismatch and, more specifically, on overqualification. Only men from Pakistan and Bangladesh figure among the foreign-born nationalities with high overqualification rates, for those who migrated to Sweden after the age of 13. Three East Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea) and India are the four nationalities with lower rates among the same group of foreign-born men.

While the incidence of overqualification is higher among people who migrated before the age of 13, Asian men are doing even better among this group in comparison to those who migrated after the age of 13 and children of immigrants: there are no Asian nationalities among the top 10 countries with the highest overqualification while four countries (Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea) are represented among the least overqualified. Among Asian women, however, the situation is not so favorable: for the foreign-born who migrated to Sweden after the age of 13, South Korea, China, and Japan also show higher rates. For those who migrated before that age, women from Vietnam/Cambodia, the Philippines, and China are among the major 10 nationalities with the highest incidence of overqualification, whereas Japan and Thailand figure among those with the lowest incidence.

As for the children of immigrants, men from Sri Lanka and Pakistan compared to those from Thailand, Bangladesh, India, China, and the Philippines figure among the nationalities with the highest and lowest incidence of overqualification, respectively, among the nationalities compared in this chapter. Among the Swedish-born children of immigrant women, those with parents from South Korea, Vietnam/Cambodia, Pakistan, Japan, and China are among the most overqualified, whereas Thailand figures among those with the lowest incidence of overqualification (Fig. 12.6).

Fig. 12.6

Share of employed overqualified people aged 25–60 in Sweden by major nationalities, 2012

Conclusion

Although perhaps temporarily, the Covid-19 pandemic brought the discussion of anti-Asian racism to the Swedish public. Public discussions and academic work on migration and integration in Sweden have so far paid little attention to the Asian population, despite its steady growth. Our ambition with this chapter was to tackle the narrative scarcity (Lee & Ramakrishnan, 2021) of Asians in Sweden. This chapter is one of the first contributions from Sweden to systematically identify the socioeconomic experiences of the heterogeneous Asian population in Sweden in comparison to other immigrant groups. The analysis and results we present should be seen as a first step in mapping out and understanding the ethnic and racial positions of Asians in Sweden, an attempt to shine a spotlight on the otherwise invisible Asians in Sweden. We attempt to unpack the myth of the model minority and empirically address the position of Asians in Sweden, in terms of racial triangulation to dominant native-born Swedes and other minority groups such as Middle Eastern or Afro-Swedes.

The statistical analysis of register data shows some similarities among East and South Asian compared to Southeast Asian nationalities in education and occupational level: the former has a higher share of highly educated people and of people employed in highly skilled occupations, whereas Southeast Asians are underrepresented among the highly skilled. The picture of employment is more mixed, but a reverse pattern can be seen in the data: South Asian nationalities are still overrepresented among the groups with the highest employment rates whereas East Asians have, in general, a relatively low incidence of employment. The incidence of overqualification is relatively low for Asian men but relatively high for women. In general, women are better educated than men but have slightly worse employment outcomes.

In sum, our analysis shows that, as in the case of the United States, there is great variation of socioeconomic outcomes of Asians in Sweden and, therefore, it is not possible to generalize their experiences. There seems to be, however, some internal differences based on the regions of origin: East Asian groups are highly educated but have lower employment rates. Once employed, they work in highly skilled occupations. Southeast Asians have lower education and, therefore, are underrepresented in highly skilled jobs but have high employment rates. South Asians stand between these two groups. These patterns within the Asian groups are strikingly similar to the situation in the United States (e.g., Chin, 2020; Lee & Ramakrishnan, 2021).

Furthermore, there are also differences within each region and across generations. For example, the children of Korean immigrants have the highest employment rates among all groups analyzed in this chapter, whereas the children of Chinese immigrants have the lowest. Differences between the groups that we observe may depend on several intersecting factors. More research analyzing potential reasons behind these patterns, such as reasons for migration, average time of residency in Sweden, migration history of each nationality, or racism and discrimination toward Asians in the labor market and society, in general, is needed to understand where Asians stand in Swedish society today. Some Asian groups may experience proximity to the majority society through their socioeconomic status, however, this does not shield them from racism and discrimination. Research from the United States shows that Asian Americans face significant racism and discrimination in the labor market (Chin, 2020).

What do all these results say about the model minority myth and Asians’ racial position in Swedish society in relation to other minority groups? As stated earlier, Asian experiences are diverse, some leaning more towards the predominantly refugee-oriented immigrant groups (Iraq, Iran, Eritrea, and Somalia) while other groups show higher educational levels than those of European and North American origins. More specifically, the results indicate that East Asians exhibit certain merit-based power with their higher educational levels and occupational matches. However, this only supports the myth of the model minority as the employment outcomes themselves not as equally as promising even for East Asians. In fact, Asians across generations in general, especially Southeast Asians, show similar paths as the other non-European groups that we examined with respect to employment, education, and overqualification. In the cross-sectional analysis there was no indication that Asians are a model minority group, succeeding and excelling in employment and education, especially when we look at the children of immigrants.

Through the analysis of the 2012 register data, we provide a snapshot of the diversity of Asians in Sweden before the Covid-19 pandemic. The mobility of persons of Asian origins in Sweden was indeed heavily influenced by the pandemic because of the temporary closure of the Swedish and EU borders. It was not only the EU borders but also their home countries’ border controls and quarantine measurements that affected and continue to affect the mobility of many Asians. The various long-term consequences of Covid-19 on Asians—or any other populations with foreign background—in Sweden are unknown. Furthermore, beyond the effects of the pandemic on Asians in Sweden, quantitative and qualitative research addressing the social, economic and political positions of Asians in Sweden is needed to understand the migration and integration trajectories of Asians in relation to other minority groups in Sweden.

In order to understand the mechanism of racial triangulation, it is especially important to highlight the individual experiences and narratives together with the systematic analysis of Asians with different ethnic, migration and socioeconomic backgrounds. This is especially important in the post-Covid era, where mobility was disrupted, and racially targeted hate was experienced. As the population of Asians is growing through both new births and new migrants, it is crucial to understand how Asians and other immigrant groups are perceived in the Swedish society in order to understand the idea of nativity-based power (Tawa et al., 2013), as well as whether racial and ethnic minorities are perceived as Swedish and as part of Swedish society. One study indicates that it is only those who are racially categorized as White who are perceived as Swedish (Osanami Törngren & Nyström, 2022). Analyzing Asian experiences is integral in unpacking the layers of privileges and disadvantages that different racial and ethnic minority and majority groups possess, as well as to understand inclusion and exclusion from Swedish society.

Our hope is that this chapter not only raises awareness about the population that is otherwise overlooked in research concerning migration and integration but also questions fundamental assumptions regarding experiences of Asians versus those of other immigrant groups in Sweden. Heterogeneous experiences in socioeconomic status alongside the social images and treatment of Asians may form or divide the experiences and identity of Asians in the future. Whether the Covid-19 pandemic brought together heterogeneous Asians—and, more generally, other migrants across countries with diverse socioeconomic status and nationalities, is a relevant question to pose (Lerpold et al., 2023, this volume) also in relation to the ideas of racial triangulation. Persons of Asian origins, especially East Asians, had an increased risk of facing racially charged, pandemic related hate, something that Afro-Swedes and Swedes with Middle Eastern background may otherwise face daily. Whether the globally spread anti-Asian rhetoric generated and legitimized through the pandemic will continue, and how differentiated yet common experiences of discrimination and exclusion across racial groups will be framed and understood by the public and individuals in society may determine not only the course of formation of Asian experiences and identity but also the answer to the question whether migrants across countries will be brought together in the post-Covid Sweden.